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9 
10 A. Introduction 
11 Despite laudable intentions, since its inception, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 of England and 
13 Wales (MCA) has proved to be a controversial piece of legislation.1 Some commentators have 
14 
15 criticised the technical legal provisions of the Act, exposing the problems with the legal test 
16 
17 for capacity and the interpretational ambiguities associated with best interests.
2 Others have 
18 focused on the more philosophical questions underpinning the legislation, exploring the 
20 frictions that exist between the concepts of paternalism versus autonomy, and protection versus 
21 
22 empowerment3. The majority of legal scholarship has concentrated on how these various 
23 tensions arise, and are dealt with, in relation to the treatment of incapacitated patients.4 
25 However, there is an additional and somewhat unexplored dimension to the MCA, that of 
26 
27 research.5 Sections 30 to 33 of the MCA allow intrusive research to be lawfully carried out on, 
28 
29 or in relation to, a person who lacks capacity.6 The legislation does not, therefore, completely 
30 prohibit research. Rather, it purports to adopt a permissive approach, seeking to recognise the 
32 potential value that incapacitated participants can bring to answering particular research 
33 
34    
35 
*** 
36 
37 1 See Mary Donnelly, ‘Changing Values and Growing Expectations: The Evolution of Capacity Law (2017) 70 
38 
Current Legal Problems 305; Amel Alghrani et al., ‘The Mental Capacity Act 2005—Ten Years On’ (2016) 3 
39 
Medical Law Review 311. 
40 
41 2 Mary Donnelly, ‘Best Interests in the Mental Capacity Act: Time to say Goodbye?’ (2016) 24 Medical Law 
42 Review 318; Mary Donnelly, ‘Determining Best Interests Under the Mental Capacity Act 2005’ (2011) 19 Medical 
43 Law Review 304. 
44 
45 3 Paul Skowron, ‘The Relationship between Autonomy and Adult Mental Capacity in the Law of England and 
46 Wales’ (2018) Medical Law Review: doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/medlaw/fwy016; Beverley A Clough, ‘New 
47 Legal Landscapes: (Re) Constructing the Boundaries of Mental Capacity Law’ (2018) 26 Medical Law Review 
48 246; Camilla Kong, Mental Capacity in Relationship: Decision-Making, Dialogue and Autonomy (CUP 2017); 
49 B. Clough, ‘“People Like That”: Realising the Social Model in Mental Capacity Jurisprudence’ (2015) 23 Medical 
50 Law Review 53. 
51 
52 
4 Helen J Taylor,’“What Are “Best Interests”? A Critical Evaluation of “Best Interests” Decision-Making in 
53 Clinical Practice’ (2016) 24 Medical Law Review 176. 
54 
55 
5 Gillian Loomes, ‘Researching About Us Without Us: Exploring Research Participation and the Politics of 
56 Disability Rights in the Context of the Mental Capacity Act 2005’ (2018) 44 Journal of Medical Ethics 424; JV 
57 McHale, ‘Research, Ethics Review and Mental Capacity: Where Now After the Mental Capacity Act 2005?’ 
58 (2009) 5 Research Ethics Review 65. 
59 
6 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 30 – 33. 
60 
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3 questions.  Nonetheless, given that often research may be conducted not for the benefit of an 
4 
5 individual, but only for the benefit of others, the MCA remains sensitive to the enhanced 
6 
7 vulnerability of incapacitated participants and inserts additional measures of protection. First, 
8 a project will only be deemed lawful under the MCA once an appropriate independent body, 
10 which is now defined as an approved MCA Research Ethics Committee (MCA REC), has 
11 
12 authorised it.7 Secondly, before researchers can proceed with MCA REC sanctioned research, 
13 a personal or nominated consultee needs to be appointed who must offer an opinion about the 
15 
willingness and likely wishes of any potential incapacitated participant.8 
16 
17 The MCA operates from the basis that research involving incapacitated participants can 
18 
19 ordinarily proceed, unless the activities in question fall with the Act’s definition of intrusive 
20 research. 9 Where research falls within the definition, it will be prima facie unlawful unless it 
22 adheres to additional requirements stipulated by the legislation. These additional requirements 
23 
24 state that any research must be connected with an impairing condition affecting P, or its 
25 
26 treatment.
10 An MCA REC must also consider from the outset whether or not there are 
27 reasonable grounds for believing that research of comparable effectiveness could be carried 
29 out on persons who have capacity to consent to taking part in it.11 Finally, the best interests 
30 
31 test, which is used to render lawful an array of other decisions under the broader terms of MCA, 
32 does not apply to research.12  This is replaced by a set of conditions that demand an assessment 
34 of the potential benefit to risk ratio that an incapacitated research participant may be exposed 
35 
36 to and, in cases where there may be no value whatsoever to that individual, of the potential 
37 
38 benefits that may be conferred on persons affected by the same or similar condition.13 Due to 
39 incapacitated participants being unable to consent for themselves, and that findings may often 
41 only benefit others, research is set apart from other aspects of the legislation. The intention 
42 
43 behind this was to provide a suitable balance between appropriate protection on the one hand, 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 7 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 31 (1); Mental Capacity Act 2005 (Appropriate Body) (England) Regulations 2006. 
49 
50 
8 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 32 (1) – (5). 
51 
52 
9 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 30 (2) (a) – (b). We explore this definition in more detail below. 
53 
10 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 31 (2) (a) – (b). 
5 
11 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 31 (4). 
56 
57 
12 Peter Bartlett, Blackstone’s Guide to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (2nd edn, OUP 2008) at 89. 
58 
59 13 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 31 (5) (a) and (b). 
60 
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3 and the need to maintain sufficient scope for participant inclusion and empowerment on the 
4 
5 other.14 
6 
7 We argue here, however, that the research provisions of the MCA are obscure and that 
8 their misinterpretation could lead to an overly restrictive attitude, which is damaging to notions 
10 of inclusivity and empowerment. First, it is not entirely clear what type of research should fall 
11 
12 within the purview of the Act, and an apparent focus on medically-intrusive research causes 
13 some  key  areas  to  be  overlooked. Quite apart from that, in initially calling for some 
15 
consideration as to whether or not more effective research could be carried out on a capacitous 
16 
17 individual, the MCA begins by making a dangerous comparison that could undermine the value 
18 
19 and status of an incapacitated participant’s involvement in research. Thus, some of the Act’s 
20 research-targeted provisions do not sit comfortably with the growing emphasis on supported 
22 decision-making promulgated by Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
23 
24 Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) and so the true extent to which the legislation empowers 
25 
26 participants  remains  a  subject of contention.
15 The tailor-made standards for approving 
27 research are also poorly worded, and their inclusion perhaps unnecessary. Finally, difficulties 
29 are also encountered because the aspects of the MCA that attempt to guarantee that an 
30 
31 incapacitated participant’s voice is heard in the approval process, operate under some basic 
32 misapprehensions. 
34 This paper begins by exploring the exact parameters of the MCA in relation to 
35 
36 research.16 It seeks to address the critical question of precisely what is meant by ‘intrusive’ 
37 
38 research and considers what may fall within this definition.  We then argue that in demanding 
39 an  assessment  of  the  comparative  effectiveness  of  incapacitated  compared  to capacitous 
41 participants, the MCA actually sets off on the wrong foot and needs to fundamentally rethink 
42 
43 its starting premise. It also needs to reconsider what research needs to be connected with in 
44 
45 order to be countenanced. Thereafter, the rationale for abandoning the best interests principle 
46 is analysed and we examine whether the new substantive thresholds serve any meaningful 
48 purpose. The discussion finally proceeds to investigate the other safeguards introduced by the 
49 
50 
51 
52 
14      HL    Deb    01    February    2005,    vol    669,    cols    133   –   139. https://api.parliament.uk/historic- 
53 hansard/lords/2005/feb/01/mental-capacity-bill-37-pm#S5LV0669P0_20050201_HOL_123 <Accessed 26th 
54 February 2019>. 
55 
56 
15 Article 12 (2) stresses that States Parties shall recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on 
57 an equal basis with others in all aspects of life. 
58 
16 For the purposes of clarity, it should be noted that the regulations in the MCA are not concerned with research 
59 involving investigational medical products. In addition, special regulations apply to clinical trials and we do not 
60 address those here. See Brazier and Cave (n 77). 
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3 Act, focusing on the obligations placed on the researcher, the consultee and MCA RECs.  We 
4 
5 assert that contrasting obligations and expectations are placed on different parties in the 
6 
7 approval process, which creates a blurred sense of responsibility and a potential chilling effect. 
8 
9 
B. Setting Off on the Wrong Foot 
11 
12 i) Imprecise Parameters 
13 The provisions of the MCA apply only to ‘intrusive’ research, which is defined as research of 
15 
a kind that would be unlawful it if was carried out on, or in relation to, a person who had 
16 
17 capacity to consent to it, but without his consent.17 It is only if research falls within this 
18 
19 category that the further provisions of the MCA will be engaged. The principal focus of this 
20 definition initially appeared to be on invasive medical research, typically involving some 
22 physical interference with a participant’s body.18 Thus, if a researcher embarked upon a project 
23 
24 which involved some physical manipulation of an incapacitated patient’s knee, that would 
25 
26 amount to ‘intrusive research’. The reason for this is that if identical research were to be 
27 performed on a capacitous participant, her consent would be needed for it to be lawful and not 
29 characterised as tortious battery.19 Nevertheless, there is a grey area in the legislation that calls 
30 
31 into question certain types of non-invasive research. 
32 Observational research, for example, raises a number of issues and arguably recasts the 
34 original scope of the MCA’s research provisions. In order for this type of activity to fall within 
35 
36 the definition of intrusive research, a rule of law must be identified that would cause the 
37 
38 research to be unlawful if it were to be carried out on a non-consenting capacitous patient.20 
39 Battery would not apply unless there was any unauthorised touching, and this would seldom 
41 occur in most types of observational research.21 Bartlett, however, argues that Article 8 of the 
42 
43 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) could be engaged to render some 
44 
45 observational research unlawful, where a capacitous participant did not consent to it.
22 Article 
46 
47 
48 
49 17 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 30 (2) (a) and (b). 
50 
51 
18 See Law Comm 231, draft bill, cl 11 (4) (d). See also Bartlett (n 12) at 88; McHale (n 5) at 66. 
52 
53 
19 See Wilson v Pringle [1987] QB 237; Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172. 
54 
20 Above (n 17). 
56 
21 Some methods of observational research may involve a level of hands-on touching. For example, observing 
57 
blood pressure levels will demand some physical contact with a participant. 
58 
59 22 Bartlett (n 12) at 88. 
60 
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3 8 (1) of the ECHR provides that everyone has the right to respect for his private and family 
4 
5 life, his home and his correspondence, and section 6 (1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 states 
6 
7 that it is unlawful for a public authority, such as an NHS body or a university, to act in a way 
8 which  is  incompatible  with  a Convention right.23 Article 8 (1) is qualified and can be 
10 legitimately interfered with in certain circumstances under Article 8 (2).24 
11 
12 The difficulty is that not all observational research is the same and could, potentially, 
13 interfere with a participant’s privacy to varying degrees. In recognition of this, Bartlett draws 
15 
a distinction between observational research that may involve a participant undergoing a 
16 
17 medical examination in a doctor’s surgery, compared to that which may be conducted on a 
18 
19 hospital ward.25   He argues that the former would invoke a ‘particularly strong’ expectation of 
20 privacy, whereas the latter, due to its more public nature, may not do so to the same extent.26 
22 While we accept that the applicability of Article 8 (1) is very much fact-specific, given the 
23 
24 evolving nature of the jurisprudence, we suggest that nowadays a strong argument could be 
25 
26 advanced in favour of Article 8 (1) of the ECHR being engaged in both of the above scenarios, 
27 and indeed in many more observational research settings.
27 The fact that any observation takes 
29 place in a more public environment, in our view, would not automatically render Article 8 (1) 
30 
31 redundant. It has been recognised that ‘there is a zone of interaction of a person with others, 
32 even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of “private life”’.28 Expanding upon 
34 this, Bartlett alludes to common examples of observational research in healthcare settings that 
35 
36 could invoke a reasonable expectation of privacy, such as observations in hospital wards, care 
37 
38 homes,  surgeries  and  a  patient’s own home.29 This list is not exhaustive and could be 
39 
40    
41 23 Human Rights Act 1998, s 6 (1). See also Article 8 (1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
42 
43 24 Article 8 (2) of the European Convention on Human Rights states that there shall be no interference by a public 
44 authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
45 democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, 
46 for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
47 and freedoms of others. 
48 
49 25 Bartlett (n 12) at 88. 
50 
51 26 Ibid. 
52 
53 
27 See Peck v United Kingdom App No 4464/98 (ECtHR 28th January 2003); Perry v United Kingdom App No 
54 63737/00 (ECtHR 17th July 2003). 
55 
56 
28 See P.G. and J.H. v United Kingdom App No 44787/98 (ECtHR 25th September 2001) at [56]. For discussion 
57 see Nicole V Moreham, ‘The Right to Respect for Private Life in the European Convention on Human Rights: A 
58 Re-examination.’ (2008) European Human Rights Law Review 44. 
59 
29 Bartlett (n 12) at 88. 
60 
Medical Law International Page 6 of 36 
 
 
 
9 
14 
21 
28 
33 
40 
47 
52 
58 
 
1 Medical Law International Submission 
2 
Page 6 of 36 
3 developed to include observations of focus group discussions, behaviour of inhabitants of 
4 
5 specific communities, and communications between individuals in institutions and places of 
6 
7 work. These are all environments in which a ‘zone of interaction’ of a person with others could 
8 be present, causing notions of what is public and private to intersect. 
10 It thus seems likely that a certain amount of observational research conducted by an 
11 
12 NHS body would at least engage the Article 8 (1) rights of a capacitous participant if it were 
13 to be conducted without her consent and would, therefore, prima facie fall within the MCA’s 
15 
definition of intrusive research if the same were to be performed on an incapacitated 
16 
17 participant.30 To make a final determination on breach, the question of whether any 
18 
19 interference with her right was legitimate under Article 8 (2) would then need to be addressed. 
20 It is conceivable that some observational healthcare research could be justified on the grounds 
22 that is necessary in a democratic society for public safety or to protect health and morals and 
23 
24 that, provided it was done in accordance with the law, any interference with the right could be 
25 
26 justified under Article 8 (2).
31 If this held sway, the research would not be unlawful and so 
27 would fall outside the definition of intrusive research for the purposes of the MCA. However, 
29 it will not be possible to justify all research on these grounds, especially where it is a smaller 
30 
31 and more concentrated project that does not have the scope to benefit society more widely. 
32 Where interference is incapable of such justification, the research would be unlawful and thus 
34 correspond with the MCA’s definition of intrusive research. Considering matters through the 
35 
36 lens of Article 8, the overall conclusion as to which types of observational research would be 
37 
38 caught by the definition is far from straightforward. Yet, it does appear that some of it would, 
39 which  may  well  be  beyond  the  initial  contemplation  of  the  MCA’s  research-targeted 
41 provisions.32 
42 
43 Further methods of research that remain contentious are interviews and questionnaires. 
44 
45 Where, for instance, a university researcher wishes to involve incapacitated participants in her 
46 project, would her work fall within the MCA’s definition of intrusive research and thus require 
48 her to comply with the additional regulatory requirements by gaining specific MCA REC 
49 
50 approval? Where is the rule of law that would deem such activity unlawful should it be 
51 performed on a capacitous participant, without her consent? If a participant was interviewed 
53 
54 
55 
56 
30 Above (n 27) and (n 28). 
57 
31 See, for discussion, Uzun v Germany App No 35623/05 (ECtHR 2nd September 2010). 
59 32 Above (n 18). 
60 
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3 and the conversation then taped and transcribed, if any findings were published and it became 
4 
5 possible to identify her as a result, assuming she had not consented, it seems likely that her 
6 
7 Article 8  (1)  rights  would be engaged.33 However, this overlooks the fact that interview 
8 research is often not conducted in this way and that transcriptions are, not infrequently, 
10 anonymised.34 The same is true of the majority of data collected in questionnaires.35 It is 
11 
12 stretching things to suggest that privacy is threatened by interview or questionnaire findings 
13 that are not linked in any way to one particular individual, and which safeguard participant 
15 
anonymity throughout. To conduct either an anonymous interview or a questionnaire on a 
16 
17 capacitous participant without her consent may well be unethical, but to say that it would be 
18 
19 unlawful on the basis of an infringement of Article 8 seems much less convincing. It is therefore 
20 less likely that this would fall within the definition of intrusive research for the purposes of the 
22 MCA 2005. 
23 
24 It is important to acknowledge as well that developments in data protection law may 
25 
26 provoke arguments about the lawfulness of research on non-consenting capacitous participants 
27 which sit distinct from any Article 8 considerations. If, say, research data was gathered and 
29 processed from a capacitous participant as part of an observational or questionnaire study, 
30 
31 under data protection legislation would it be unlawful for that to happen without her consent? 
32 If so, arguably, it could then fall within the meaning of intrusive research for the purposes of 
34 the MCA, if it were to be performed on an incapacitated participant. While we have insufficient 
35 
36 space here to provide a thorough analysis of the impact of the General Data Protection 
37 
38 Regulation (GDPR), for the present purposes it suffices to say that, while consent is one 
39 potential ground for lawful processing of data, it is not the only one.36 Some research data 
41 could potentially be lawfully processed without consent on the basis that it is necessary for the 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 33 See Smith and Grady v United Kingdom App Nos 33985/96 and 33986/96 (ECtHR 27th December 1999). In 
47 this case it was held that were detailed investigations took place, including interviews of a sensitive and intimate 
48 nature, where any findings were then made public and individuals could subsequently be identified, a violation of 
49 Article 8 occurred. 
50 
51 34 Barbara DiCicco-Bloom and Benjamin F Crabtree, ‘The Qualitative Research Interview’ (2006) 40 Medical 
52 Education 314. 
53 
54 
35 Ann Bowling and Shah Ebrahim (eds), Handbook of Health Research Methods: Investigation, Measurement 
55 and Analysis (1
st edn, OUP 2005). 
56 
36 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
57 natural persons with regard to the processing of person data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing 
58 Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (Text with EEA relevance), [2016] OJ L 119/1. See 
59 also Data Protection Act 2018. 
60 
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3 purposes  of  a  legitimate interest. 37 This particular ground is the most flexible and thus 
4 
5 provided any research data collected and used was then processed in accordance with the data 
6 
7 protection principles, it would not automatically be unlawful by virtue of the absence of 
8 consent.38 As such, it should not be assumed that data protection laws will impact upon the 
10 MCA’s definition of intrusive research in every case, particularly in the context of methods 
11 
12 which anonymise data, because the relevant legislation then no longer applies.39 Ambiguities 
13 are undoubtedly rife, but nonetheless in our view the majority of research involving 
15 
incapacitated participants seeking to employ interview and/or questionnaire methods would 
16 
17 fall outside the MCA’s definition of intrusive research, meaning that strictly speaking 
18 
19 researchers should not be bound to follow the rest of the authorisation provisions. Whether or 
20 not this is recognised in practice is a moot point. 
22 Regardless of the correct position of the lawfulness or otherwise of certain types of 
23 
24 observational, interview and questionnaire research without consent, the MCA Code of 
25 
26 Practice (COP), and other associated professional regulatory guidelines, have sought to provide 
27 further guidance on the meaning of intrusive research. The COP, at various junctures, seems 
29 to hedge its bets by suggesting that interview and observational research could be intrusive 
30 
31 research in certain circumstances,40 whereas the guidance from the Health Research Authority 
32 (HRA) is a little more forthright. It states that intrusive research includes non-interventional 
34 research where consent is legally required.41 The guidance then proceeds to give examples of 
35 
36 the administration of questionnaires, interviews or observations.42 There is nothing inaccurate 
37 
38 about that, but the guidance lacks sufficient depth and clarity on the examples it provides of 
39 
40    
41 37 Above (n 36). Article 6 (1) (f). It should be noted that if any research data related to health, it would be classed 
42 as ‘special category data’. Alongside the legitimate expectation ground, a further justification would also be 
43 needed for the lawful processing of this data. In a research context, this is most likely to be founded under Article 
44 9, (j), in which processing is necessary for achieving purposes in the public interest, and scientific or historical 
45 research. 
46 
47 38 For the data protection principles, see (n 36), Article 5 (1) (a) – (f). For information on the wide interpretation 
48 of the legitimate interest ground, see https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the- 
49 general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/lawful-basis-for-processing/legitimate-interests/ <accessed 22nd Feb 
50 2019>. 
51 
52 
39 Anonymised data falls outside the definition of ‘personal data’, contained in (n 36) Article 4 (1). For older 
53 English authority on this point, see R v Department of Health, ex p Source Informatics Ltd (No.1) [2001] QB 424. 
54 
40 Mental Capacity Act 2005: Code of Practice, para [11.15] and [11.18]. 
6
41 NHS Health Research Authority, Mental Capacity Act: https://www.hra.nhs.uk/planning-and-improving- 
57 
research/policies-standards-legislation/mental-capacity-act/. <Accessed 21st February 2019>. 
59 42 Ibid. 
60 
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3 non-intrusive research.  The danger here is that researchers may be inclined to read this and to 
4 
5 think  that  every  project  utilising  questionnaires,  interviews  and  observations  involving 
6 
7 incapacitated participants will automatically fall within the scope of the MCA and must 
8 therefore comply with the regulatory requirements for research approval. 
10 As it is probable that researchers will often consult the COP and HRA guidance first, 
11 
12 we suggest that addressing the uncertainties associated with the central definition of intrusive 
13 research, which is crucial to how the remainder to the MCA research provisions operate, is a 
15 
matter that needs to be clarified to a greater extent than is currently the case. It is not unusual 
16 
17 for primary legislation to remain sufficiently broad to allow some scope for development and 
18 
19 adaptation.43 This may well have been the intention underpinning the MCA’s definition of 
20 intrusive research and there may well have been merit in that drafting technique, for adopting 
22 that approach has allowed the law to remain flexible and capable of adapting to changes in 
23 
24 legal and social attitudes towards human rights, and research.44 Delegating the finer points to 
25 
26 supplementary guidance from the COP and HRA therefore confers a number of benefits on the 
27 MCA in the sense that the former documents not only complement, but also elaborate upon, 
29 the more general framework provided by the latter. Nevertheless, if the guidance contained in 
30 
31 those documents remains opaque, little will be done to obviate some of the problems 
32 encountered by those involved in research practice. If the legislation, and the guidance from 
34 the COP and HRA, are fostering a belief amongst researchers that every type of interview, 
35 
36 questionnaire and observational study is automatically intrusive research, then that belief is not 
37 
38 only legally incorrect, but also creates a further practical problem. 
39 If the practice is now to refer every project that adopts interview, questionnaire or 
41 observational methods to MCA RECs for approval as a matter of course, this may be an 
42 
43 unnecessary  drain  on  already   scarce  resources.45 Consider, for example, a university 
44 
45 researcher who wishes to conduct interview or questionnaire research involving incapacitated 
46 participants who are not NHS patients, but who are drawn from a wider cross-section of society. 
48 In this scenario, McHale suggests that ‘an alternative approach would be to allow some forms 
49 
50 
51 
52 
43 See, for example, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Acts of 1990 and 2008, which are supplemented by 
53 the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority: Code of Practice (v9 2018). 
54 
44 See HL Deb 01 Feb 2005, vol 669, cols 132-135: https://api.parliament.uk/historic- 
55 hansard/lords/2005/feb/01/mental-capacity-bill-37-pm#S5LV0669P0_20050201_HOL_123 <Accessed 26th 
56 February 2019>. 
57 
58 
45 A key component of the ASSENT Project at UEA is to assess how many applications MCA REC actually 
59 
receive in respect of incapacitated participants. 
60 
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3 of research concerning persons lacking capacity to be referred for approval to committees other 
4 
5 than NHS research ethics committees, such as university research ethics committees’. 46   This 
6 
7 argument has merit, for often a university research ethics committee may be better placed to 
8 review certain projects. In some areas, such as social sciences, they may have a wider and 
10 more localised pool of expertise to conveniently draw on. Whatever the solution, as things 
11 
12 stand, the contours of the MCA remain poorly defined and the COP and HRA guidance do 
13 little to alleviate this uncertainty. 
15 
16 
ii) Operating from the Wrong Basis 
18 Alongside the scope of the legislation remaining ambiguous, there are further aspects of the 
19 
20 requirements for approval that provide cause for concern. As a corollary of its apparent 
21 
22 emphasis on medically-invasive research, the MCA also adopts a limited view of what research 
23 has to be connected with when dealing with incapacitated participants. 
25 In order to meet the requirements for approval, the research must be connected with an 
26 
27 impairing condition affecting the participant, or its treatment.47 An impairing condition is one 
28 that is attributable to, or which causes or contributes to, the impairment of, or disturbance in 
30 the functioning of, the mind or brain.48 It thus portrays a heavily medicalised model of what is 
31 
32 deemed valuable in research, which is wedded to the belief that research should only be allowed 
33 
34 to proceed if the activities are directly related to improving knowledge of the causes or 
35 treatment of the condition that an incapacitated participant is herself suffering from, which is 
37 impinging on her capacity. This neglects to consider that, provided there is adequate support 
38 
39 to help her, an incapacitated participant may remain capable of not only adding value to certain 
40 
41 types of research that may be wholly unconnected to her medical condition, but also of 
42 communicating a desire to become involved in such work.
49 Here the terms of the MCA 
43 
44 arguably focuses the mind on the wrong line of inquiry. When confronted by a participant 
45 
46 who lacks capacity, but who is nonetheless able to express and communicate a desire to become 
47 
48 
49 46 McHale (n 5) at 67. McHale’s reference to ‘NHS research ethics committees’ is what we have labelled MCA 
50 RECs throughout this piece. 
51 
52 
47 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 31 (2) (a) and (b). 
53 
54 
48 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 31 (3). 
55 
56 
49 Mabel Stevenson and Brian J Taylor, ‘Involving Individuals with Dementia as Co-Researchers in Analysis of 
57 Findings from a Qualitative Study’ (2019) 18 Dementia 701; Julie Calveley, ‘Including Adults with Intellectual 
58 Disabilities who Lack Capacity to Consent in Research’ (2012) 19 Nursing Ethics 558; Ruth Bartlett, ‘Modifying the Diary Interview Method to Research the Lives of People With Dementia’ (2012) 22 Qualitative Health 
60 
Research 1717. 
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3 involved in research, the emphasis should not really be on ‘allowing’ someone else to make a 
4 
5 decision to include that participant once certain conditions are met. It should be more about the 
6 
7 researcher and the participant working together in order to create a culture of supported 
8 decision-making. Where adequate support is provided, it will often be possible for both parties 
10 to mutually identify where and how an incapacitated participant could add value to a project, 
11 
12 which in no way should be limited to just medical value connected to impairments of capacity. 
13 By way of illustration, consider a general research project conducted by local 
15 
government aimed at exploring society’s perceptions of how local amenities could be 
16 
17 improved. Researchers involved in the project recognise that the study would almost certainly 
18 
19 benefit, to the extent that it is possible, from input from incapacitated participants. After 
20 reading the HRA guidance, and COP, the researchers assume that their methods would amount 
22 to intrusive research and would thus need to satisfy the research provisions of the MCA. 
23 
24 Leaving aside the rights or wrongs of that interpretation of intrusive research, a creative reading 
25 
26 of the other legislative provisions would still be required to justify her inclusion, which jars 
27 with any notion of empowerment. It is actually left to the COP to clarify that treatment is not 
29 confined purely to medical treatment, but even then it still states that research can only be 
30 
31 authorised if it is linked in some way to the condition affecting an incapacitated participant 
32 herself, or to others who suffer from the same or a similar condition.50 This misses the point; 
34 the hypothetical research project above should not have to be justified on the basis that the 
35 
36 contribution of an incapacitated participant may improve matters from her perspective as the 
37 
38 sufferer of a mental impairment, or indeed that it may help others with similar or related 
39 conditions. It should be justified by recognition that she is a member of the public herself, who 
41 may be capable of communicating valid input into any research for the benefit of other 
42 
43 individuals in society whose capacity is not compromised. The fact that wording the MCA 
44 
45 does not encourage matters to be viewed from this broader perspective paves the way for a 
46 restrictive outlook to take shape, which permeates throughout the remainder of the MCA’s 
48 research framework. 
49 
50 A similar attitude is fostered in relation to the ground for approval that requires 
51 consideration as to whether research of comparable effectiveness could be carried out on a 
53 capacitous person.51 This stems from a wider ethical concern that incapacitated participants 
54 
55 
56    
57 
50 Mental Capacity Act 2005: Code of Practice, para [11.16]. 
59 51 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 31 (4). 
60 
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3 should not be used in research simply out of a matter of convenience, which is an admirable 
4 
5 position to adopt in one sense.52    Nevertheless, its phrasing may cause a researcher to always 
6 
7 begin by asking herself the question: ‘can I answer this research question without involving 
8 incapacitated participants?’ This may subconsciously encourage a researcher to err on the side 
10 of exclusion and if this attitude gains traction it creates a distorted impression of the value that 
11 
12 an incapacitated participant may be able to bring to research in her own right. Just because 
13 research of comparable effectiveness may be capable of being achieved by using only 
15 
capacitous participants, it does not automatically mean that incapacitated participants should 
16 
17 be completely omitted from a project. Perhaps a more suitable way to phrase the condition 
18 
19 would be to impose on a researcher on obligation to ‘provide reasonable evidence to support 
20 that she has given appropriate consideration as to why and how any research project will derive 
22 value from the inclusion of incapacitated participants’. Provided value is broadly conceived, 
23 
24 this construction removes any comparative element, which may project a stronger recognition 
25 
26 from the law that both sets of participants may be capable of contributing something of equal 
27 worth to research. 
29 It has been argued by some that the more general terms of MCA conflict with the 
30 
31 renewed emphasis on supported decision-making endorsed by the UNCRPD.53 The particular 
32 demand for a comparative assessment of capacitated versus incapacitated participants in the 
34 sphere of research is a paradigm example of the MCA failing to recognise what supported 
35 
36 decision-making  is actually about.54 Rather than promoting an attitude of exclusion, the 
37 
38 legislation should aim not only to focus on the ways in which it can recognise the valid 
39 contribution that incapacitated participants bring to research, but also on how its provisions 
41 could effectively accommodate and facilitate their involvement in the process. It should seek 
42 
43 to maximise avenues of support for a participant in research and, where possible, to assist her 
44 
45 
46 
47 52 Bartlett (n 12) at 89; George F Tomossy and David N Weisstub, Revival: Human Experimentation and Research 
48 (1st edn, Routledge: Taylor and Francis 2003). For an interesting historical account of the enduring ethical issues 
49 see Rebecca Dresser, ‘Mentally Disabled Research Subjects: The Enduring Policy Issues’ (1996) 276 Journal of 
50 American Medical Association 67. 
51 
52 
53 Clough (n 3); Donnelly (n 1); Donnelly (n 2). 
53 
54 
54 Loomes (n 5); Clough (n 3). See also Ciara Shiggins et al., ‘Towards an ASSET-Based Approach to Promoting 
55 and Sustaining Well-Being for People with Aphasia and their Families: An International Exploratory Study’ 
56 (2018) Aphasiology 1. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/02687038.2018.1548690; Natalie Joseph-Williams et al., 
57 ‘Implementing Shared Decision Making in the NHS: Lessons from the MAGIC Programme’ (2017) 357 BMJ 
58 1744; Treena Jingree, ‘Duty of Care, Safety, Normalisation and the Mental Capacity Act: A Discourse Analysis 
of Staff Arguments about Facilitating Choices for People with Learning Disabilities in UK Services’ (2015) 25 
60 
Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology 138. 
Page 13 of 36 Medical Law International 
 
 
 
9 
14 
21 
28 
36 
48 
57 
 
1 Medical Law International Submission 
2 
Page 13 of 36 
3 in making her own decision about participation. While it is desirable to assume that the 
4 
5 interests of an incapacitated participant should outweigh the interests of science and society, to 
6 
7 view the two interests as always being diametrically opposed may lead to a propensity to 
8 overprotect, when the direction of travel should be to place greater emphasis on collaboration 
10 between a researcher and a participant to engender empowerment.55 The research provisions 
11 
12 are ripe for an overhaul of how they visualise the position of incapacitated participants and, 
13 based on the excellent recent work of Clough, this may entail a complete reconsideration of 
15 
how notions of incapacity and its affect upon individuals are thought about.56 To clarify, the 
16 
17 argument is not that there should be no special protection for incapacitated participants in 
18 
19 research; it is that the provisions of the MCA that seek to provide it are inappropriately 
20 constructed and overly restrictive, when a more appropriate balance could be struck between 
22 protection and empowerment. The opening segments of the MCA epitomise this and begin by 
23 
24 asking the wrong questions, which sets a narrow tone for the remainder of the conditions. In 
25 
26 any event, if the underlying intention behind the insertion of specific research requirements 
27 was to provide special protection, it is not abundantly clear that they have achieved this. As 
29 we will now proceed to discuss, the further additional grounds for approval also miss their 
30 
31 target 
32 
33 
34 C. An Illusionary Different Threshold for Approving Research? 
35 Best interests occupies a central role in the MCA, providing the lawful basis upon which certain 
37 decisions can be made for those who cannot decide for themselves. In theory the test remains 
38 
39 objective, yet section 4 of the MCA provides a non-exhaustive list of both objective and 
40 
41 subjective factors that must be considered by any decision-maker when deciding what is in an 
42 incapacitated person’s best interests.
57 One interesting question surrounds its absence in the 
43 
44 arena of research, and there was some early confusion on this point. 
45 
46 In his first edition of Blackstone’s Guide to the Mental Capacity Act 2005, Bartlett 
47 argued that the guiding principles of best interests should apply to research in the same way 
49 that  they  should  apply to treatment.58 In the later edition, he then changes his position 
50 
51 
52 
53 
55 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 33 (3). On the point of collaboration, see ibid, and also NICE Guidelines: 
54 https://www.nice.org.uk/about/what-we-do/our-programmes/nice-guidance/nice-guidelines/shared-decision- 
55 making. 
56 
56 Clough, (n 3). 
58 
57 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 4; Donnelly (n 2); Taylor (n 4). 
59 
60 58 Peter Bartlett, Blackstone’s Guide to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (1st edn, OUP 2005) at 66. 
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3 accurately identifying that the best interests test is not referred to and that the research sections 
4 
5 of the MCA ‘introduce their own substantive thresholds’.59  It would seem that the omission of 
6 
7 best interests was deliberate, because its inclusion in the context of research was perceived by 
8 some to be problematic on the basis that research is seldom intended to benefit individual 
10 participants per se.60 Consequently, it was perhaps thought that endorsing a separate approach 
11 
12 would provide a more tailored type of protection, but the effectiveness of this is disputable.61 
13 At the same time, a further aim was to create a regime that was broad enough to facilitate 
15 
inclusive research, but, once again, it is not obvious that removing reference to best interests 
16 
17 has accomplished that.62 As we examine in more detail below, the thresholds for authorising 
18 
19 research require consideration of a range of factors that are not altogether dissimilar to those 
20 which must be considered under a best interests assessment, so little if anything is gained by 
22 their insertion. For the purposes of the following analysis, the provisions which we are 
23 
24 principally concerned with are sections 31 (5) (a) and 31 (5) (b) of the MCA. 
25 
26 
27 i) Benefits to Burdens Ratio: Considering the Position of the Participant (Section 31 (5) (a)) 
28 Under section 31 (5) (a), a MCA REC may not approve a research project unless it is satisfied 
30 that the research has the potential to benefit a participant without imposing on her a burden that 
31 
32 is disproportionate to the potential benefit. If research cannot be approved under this section, 
33 
34 it can nonetheless still be approved under the alternative of section 31 (5) (b), which we discuss 
35 under the next heading.63 
37 Focusing now on section 31 (5) (a), one fallout from the MCA’s apparent emphasis on 
38 
39 medically invasive research, is that any analysis of the notion of ‘benefit’ may naturally 
40 
41 gravitate  towards  identification  of medical advantages.
64 Medical benefits are frequently 
42 considered from an objective evidence-based perspective, yet to confine any examination under 
43 
44 
45 
46 59 Bartlett (n 12). 
47 
48 60 HL Deb 01 February 2005, vol 669, cols 130 – 132. https://api.parliament.uk/historic- 
49 hansard/lords/2005/feb/01/mental-capacity-bill-37-pm#S5LV0669P0_20050201_HOL_123 <Accessed 26th 
50 February 2019>. 
51 
52 
61      HL    Deb    01    February    2005,    vol    669,    cols    133   –   138. https://api.parliament.uk/historic- 
53 hansard/lords/2005/feb/01/mental-capacity-bill-37-pm#S5LV0669P0_20050201_HOL_123 <Accessed 26
th
 
54 February 2019>. 
55 
56 
62 Ibid. 
57 
63 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 31 (5) (a). 
59 64 Above n 18. 
60 
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3 section 31 (5) (a) of the MCA purely to this is too restrictive.65   This is one example of the 
4 
5 broad nature of the MCA, and the more detailed nature of the COP, working well together. 
6 
7 The COP is helpful as it elaborates on the potential meaning of ‘benefit’, embracing a more 
8 expansive approach. Section 11.14 of the COP states that alongside developing more effective 
10 ways of treating or managing a participant’s condition, benefit could also mean improving the 
11 
12 quality of health or social care that a participant may have access to, discovering the cause of 
13 the participant’s condition if she would benefit from that knowledge, and reducing the risk of 
15 
the participant being harmed excluded or disadvantaged.66 The adoption of this broader 
16 
17 interpretation is undoubtedly sensible, but it is equally important to acknowledge that these 
18 
19 considerations must be targeted at procuring some direct benefit to the individual participant 
20 herself. The subjective circumstances of an individual participant must therefore be considered 
22 carefully. Remaining cognisant of this becomes even more important when thinking about 
23 
24 potential indirect benefits under section 31 (5) (a) of the MCA. 
25 
26 If understood correctly, benefits should encompass social, psychological and emotional 
27 factors, which may be specific to the individual position of an incapacitated participant.
67 
29 There may be some situations in which she may only receive a tangentially-related benefit from 
30 
31 any involvement in research, but the fact that this may be of a marginal, non-physical nature 
32 should not prevent it from being classified as something that may be of worth to her. The COP 
34 also usefully recognises this in stating that where ‘the research involves interviews and the 
35 
36 person has the opportunity to express their views, this could be considered a real benefit to a 
37 
38 particular individual’.68  The broader potential benefit of allowing an incapacitated research 
39 participant to have her voice heard is, therefore, explicitly recognised. It follows that in order 
41 to encourage wider participation and inclusiveness, an expansive meaning must be ascribed to 
42 
43 the notion of benefit, which considers a range of both objective and subjective factors. At this 
44 
45 point, it becomes evident that the test articulated under section 31 (5) (a) of the MCA does not 
46 
47 
48 65 Matthew J Leach, ‘Evidence Based Practice in Traditional & Complementary Medicine: An Agenda for Policy, 
49 Practice, Education and Research’ (2018) 31 Complementary Therapies in Clinical Practice 38; Matthew J Leach, 
50 ‘Evidence-Based Practice: A Framework for Clinical Practice and Research Design (2006) 12 International 
51 Journal of Nursing Practice 248; Andrew Miles et al., ‘Evidence-Based Healthcare, Clinical Knowledge and the 
52 Rise of Personalised Medicine’ (2008) 14 Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 621. 
53 
54 
66 Mental Capacity Act 2005: Code of Practice, para [11.14]. 
55 
56 
67 In Re A (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1999] 12 WLUK 657; [2000] 1 FLR 549, Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss 
57 P recognised that considering these factors was crucial to any assessment of best interests, at p.10 of the Official 
58 Transcript. 
59 
68 Mental Capacity Act 2005: Code of Practice, para [11.15]. 
60 
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3 represent as radical a departure from the best interests test as some may have envisaged.69  The 
4 
5 threshold for approval is not in reality raised, because it does not demand proof of a higher 
6 
7 objective  level  of  benefit  to be present. It simply requires that a balancing exercise is 
8 undertaken which necessitates a comparative weighing of benefits versus burdens.70 Provided 
10 there is some potential benefit to a participant, and provided any associated burden is not 
11 
12 disproportionate to that benefit, the standard will be satisfied.71   The correct approach is, thus, 
13 to consider both objective and subjective considerations in this assessment and, where this is 
15 
acknowledged, the balancing exercise performed in the assessment of research under section 
16 
17 31 (5) (a), and the factors that should be included therein, is closely aligned to the manner in 
18 
19 which best interests assessments should be performed.72 
20 
21 
22 ii) Recognition of Wider Societal Benefits (Section 31 (5) (b)) 
23 Where a research project will not confer either a direct or indirect benefit on an incapacitated 
25 participant under section 31 (5) (a) of the MCA, it may still nonetheless be approved under 
26 
27 section 31 (5) (b).73   Under this section, the emphasis switches to an assessment of whether or 
28 not the research is intended to provide knowledge of the causes or treatment of, or of the  care 
30 of persons affected by, the same or a similar condition to that of the participant.74 On the basis 
31 
32 that this provision invites some consideration of the impact of the research on individuals other 
33 
34 than the incapacitated participant herself, a more visible departure from best interests may 
35 initially be apparent here. 
37 A conventional best interests decision must be made by reference to what is in the best 
38 
39 interests of a particular individual, but section 31 (5) (b) actually requires the opposite.75 It 
40 
41 distances itself from analysing matters from the subjective perspective of a would-be 
42 participant and instructs an assessor to turn her attention to any potential knowledge that could 
43 
44 be gained from research that may be useful to wider members of society.76 A different mode 
45 
46 
47 69 Bartlett (n 12). 
48 
49 70 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 31 (5) (a) and (b). 
50 
51 
71 Ibid. 
52 
53 
72 Re A (n 67); Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] Fam. 33, 55. 
54 
73 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 31 (5) (a) and (b). 
6
74 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 31 (5) (b). 
57 
58 75 Per Holman J in An NHS Trust v MB and Others [2006] EWHC 507 (Fam); [2006] 2 FLR 319 at [16] [v]. 
59 
60 76 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 31 (5) (b). 
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3 of thinking is, at first blush, required than that which would typically be expected of a decision- 
4 
5 maker under a standard best interests examination.  Casting the net wider in this way has the 
6 
7 capacity to facilitate a more inclusive and permissive approach, but where any inquiry must 
8 look beyond individual benefits, and where a participant is particularly vulnerable, it would not 
10 be unreasonable to expect a more stringent test in order to justify any research. Section 31 (5) 
11 
12 (b) does not actually provide this. Given that under this section the research must be intended 
13 to provide knowledge of causes, treatment or care of a condition, there may be an inclination 
15 
to think that it should be judged against a higher level of evidence-based criteria, but its 
16 
17 wording is prone to mislead. Section 31 (5) (b) only demands that the research must be intended 
18 
19 to provide knowledge; there is no requirement for it to be objectively proved that any research 
20 will actually produce such knowledge. As most credible research projects will be underpinned 
22 by at least an intention to develop a deeper understanding of a particular problem to help society 
23 
24 in a broader sense, the reality is that the test under section 31 (5) (b) may be easier to meet than 
25 
26 some may imagine. To mitigate against this, the legislation attempts to provide a protective 
27 counterbalance. 
29 Where section 31 (5) (b) is engaged, section 31 (6) states that there must also be 
30 
31 reasonable grounds for believing that the risk to the participant from taking part in the project 
32 will be negligible, and that anything done to, or in relation to the participant, will not interfere 
34 with her freedom of action or privacy in a significant way, or be unduly restrictive.77 This 
35 
36 directs the examination away from balancing out the risks and benefits, towards ensuring that 
37 
38 an incapacitated participant is prevented from being exposed to anything greater than a low- 
39 level risk when partaking in research designed solely to benefit of others. Those who believe 
41 that the definition of a negligible risk is something that can be calculated with precision though 
42 
43 are operating under a misapprehension. Any categorisation of a risk as being beyond negligible 
44 
45 may depend on a number of factors; emphasis could be given to percentage rates of occurrence, 
46 whereas elsewhere it may be placed on the severity of consequence should that risk materialise. 
48 Equally, it is subject to differing interpretations. For some, the mere existence of a remote risk, 
49 
50 no matter how slight, may be sufficient to classify it as something beyond negligible, thereby 
51 ruling out any authorisation of the research. This could lead to a problematic situation in which 
53 
54 
55 
56 
77 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 31 (6). As Brazier and Cave note, this is a less onerous test than is applied under 
57 the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004.  Under Sch 1, Part 5, para 9 of the Clinical 
58 Trials Regulations, the research must either benefit the patient or produce no risk at all.  See Margaret Brazier 
and Emma Cave, Medicine, Patients and the Law (6th edn, Manchester University Press 2016) at 490. Analysis of 
60 
the Clinical Trials Regulations is beyond the scope of this piece. 
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3 certain participants may be prevented from taking part in some research projects because of 
4 
5 problematic risk appraisals associated with vague definitions. The COP, for example, equates 
6 
7 ‘negligible’ with ‘minimal’ and proceeds to state that a participant should suffer ‘no harm or 
8 distress by taking part’.78 Properly understood, minimal risk should not be taken to mean no 
10 risk at all and so perhaps the COP is too restrictive on this point. It is certainly possible to 
11 
12 interpret the meaning of negligible more liberally in order to recognise that certain 
13 incapacitated participants may be capable of withstanding a greater level of risk in order to 
15 
legitimise their involvement in research. 
16 
17 This feeds into a further important point; any examination of the magnitude of a risk 
18 
19 associated with a project needs at least some consideration of how a prospective participant 
20 
may view it.79 It is therefore sensible to be explicit about the fact subjective considerations also 
22 have a role to play in the assessment of research justified on the grounds of wider societal 
23 
24 benefits. Where a participant is able to express enthusiasm for involvement in a project, it may 
25 
26 colour any assessment of what amounts to a negligible risk; a risk may exist which to some 
27 reviewers would appear more than negligible, but from the perspective of a potential participant 
29 it may not be viewed in the same way. 
30 
31 The other protective measures under section 31 (6) are also plagued by ambiguous 
32 phrases that are very much dependant on an individual. Ensuring that anything done will not 
34 amount to a ‘significant’ interference with privacy needs at least some evaluation of a 
35 
36 participant’s position and personal circumstances, because what amounts to a significant 
37 
38 interference may vary greatly.80 Similar complications are associated with the requirement not 
39 to do anything that is unduly invasive or restrictive. The meaning of ‘unduly’ is subject to the 
41 specifics of the type of research in question and how it may impact upon a range of participants 
42 
43 in potentially different ways.81 Accordingly, a pattern emerges which belies the notion that 
44 
45 section 31 (5) (b) demands a wholly objective examination when assessing any potential wider 
46 
47 
48 
49 78 Mental Capacity Act 2005: Code of Practice, para [11.18]. 
50 
51 79 See J Richard Eiser et al., ‘Risk Interpretation and Action: A Conceptual Framework for Responses to Natural 
52 Hazards (2012) 1 International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 5. 
53 
54 
80 Recently, the Supreme Court stressed the importance of the need to consider things from the particular patient’s 
55 perspective. What amounts to a significant invasion of privacy could, for example, depend on cultural beliefs and 
56 different perceptions of privacy. See Montgomery v Lanarkshire [2015] UKSC 11; [2015] AC 1430. 
57 
81 See Victoria Shepherd, ‘Research Involving Adults Lacking Capacity to Consent: The Impact of Research 
58 Regulation on ‘Evidence Biased’ Medicine (2016) BMC Medical Ethics https://doi.org/10.1186/s12910-016- 
59 0138-9; Herbert C Kelman, ‘Privacy and Research with Human Beings’ (1977) 33 Journal of Social Issues 177. 
60 
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3 societal benefits stemming from research.  Operating in tandem with the additional protective 
4 
5 mechanisms under section 31 (6), it is clear that both objective and subjective factors need to 
6 
7 be considered in a manner that is again not entirely inconsistent with the section 4 best interests 
8 approach. 
10 
11 iii) The Bespoke Research Provisions: Justified Abandonment of Best Interests? 
12 
13 While the requirements for approval of research under sections 31 (5) (a) and (b) of the MCA 
14 
15 are phrased differently, in reality they operate in much the same way as the best interests 
16 standard. There is a significant amount of replication between the nature of the factors that 
18 must be considered under both approaches, so it is difficult to discern where the bespoke 
19 
20 research principles add benefit. On the contrary, the research provisions are so opaque in places 
21 
22 that they become difficult to translate into a working model of assessment and therefore 
23 frustrate, rather than facilitate, research. Arguably the only thing they have accomplished is to 
25 create a sense of confusion amongst those who have to apply them, and a lack of consistency 
26 
27 between different aspects of the MCA, where it may have been more effective for the 
28 legislation to remain more streamlined across all areas of treatment, finances and research. 
30 Instead of incorporating a separate set of substantive thresholds, it may have been 
31 
32 simpler and more effective to require both researchers and MCA RECs to undertake a best 
33 
34 interests assessment when assessing the validity of participation in research. First, those 
35 involved in working with individuals who lack capacity – whatever type of decision is at stake 
37 – may be more accustomed to the best interests test. Applied to research, it may therefore be 
38 
39 more easily understood, because the minds of consultees and MCA REC member assessors 
40 
41 may be more attuned to considering the wider range of factors that are now commonly accepted 
42 as having to form part of a holistic balancing process, which may make evaluations more 
43 
44 rounded.82 Secondly, interpreted in an expansive manner, the concept of best interests is 
45 
46 sufficiently malleable so as to be capable of achieving a fairer balance between protection and 
47 empowerment in research. It would still allow the specific interests of a participant to be 
49 prioritised, while at the same time remaining able to consider, and accommodate, the wider 
50 
51 interests of society. Insofar as the latter is concerned, some will no doubt point out a problem 
52 
53 we alluded to earlier; what is in the best interest of an individual can never be answered by 
54 considerations pertaining to what is in the best interests of others. A significant departure 
56 would accordingly be required to allow research to proceed where it would only benefit society. 
57 
58    
59 82 Donnelly (n 1); Donnelly (n 2). 
60 
Medical Law International Page 20 of 36 
 
 
 
9 
14 
21 
28 
33 
40 
 
1 Medical Law International Submission 
2 
Page 20 of 36 
3 Where a broader view is adopted, this is not necessarily the case, particularly if the question is 
4 
5 asked: how would an incapacitated feel about her involvement in research that may not 
6 
7 necessarily help her, but which could help others? 
8 This is where best interests’ explicit endorsement of the need to consider things from 
10 the subjective perspective of an incapacitated individual under section 4 of the MCA sends a 
11 
12 much stronger and important message than is currently conveyed by sections 31 (5) (a) and (b). 
13 When determining the question of best interests, section 4 (6) of the MCA instructs a decision 
15 
maker to consider, so far as is reasonably ascertainable, the person's past and present wishes 
16 
17 and feelings (and, in particular, any relevant written statement made by him when he had 
18 
19 capacity),83 the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence his decision if he had 
20 capacity,84 and the other factors that he would be likely to consider if he were able to do so.85 
22 Under section 4 (7), provided it is practicable and appropriate to consult them, the views of 
23 
24 anyone named by the person as someone to be consulted on the matter in question or on matters 
25 
26 of that kind should also be taken into account,
86 as should the views of anyone engaged in 
27 caring for the person or interested in his welfare.
87 While best interests does not in a general 
29 sense provide a complete panacea to English law’s current incompatibly with the notion of 
30 
31 supported-decision making, these sections do help to give an incapacitated person a voice, 
32 which could be beneficial if applied to research. 
34 It is often assumed that an incapacitated participant will be unable to communicate her 
35 
36 preferences  for  any  involvement  in  research,  but  that  is  often  not  so.88 There will be 
37 
38 circumstances where she remains capable of expressing a desire to become involved and so it 
39 will be possible to identify a benefit to her own personal development and sense of worth, from 
41 contributing to something that may be of value to others.89 Even where she cannot 
42 
43 
44 83 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 4 (6) (a). 
45 
46 84 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 4 (6) (b). 
47 
48 85 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 4 (6) (c). 
49 
50 86 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 4 (7) (a). 
51 
52 
87 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 4 (7) (b). 
53 
54 
88 Benjamin W. J. Spencer et al., ‘Unwell in Hospital but not Incapable: Cross-Sectional Study on the Dissociation 
55 of Decision-Making Capacity for Treatment and Research in In-Patients with Schizophrenia and Related 
56 Psychoses’ (2018) 213 The British Journal of Psychiatry 484; Mark J. Jayes and Rebecca L Palmer, ‘Stroke 
57 Research Staff’s Experiences of Seeking Consent from People with Communication Difficulties: Results of a 
58 National Online Survey’ (2014) 21 Topics in Stroke Rehabilitation 443. 
59 
89 See, for example, Mencap, Involve Me: Independent Evaluation Report (Foundation for People with Learning 
60 Disabilities 2011). 
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3 communicate a preference, she ought not to be automatically precluded from participating in a 
4 
5 project for the wider benefit of society, and the advantage of a best interests approach in the 
6 
7 context of research would be explicit recognition from the legislation itself, and not just the 
8 COP, 90 of the need to view that question through the lens of the participant. It may be possible 
10 to conclude that she would be stimulated and enthused by a desire to contribute to society by 
11 
12 helping others, which would induce a sense of happiness in her. Researchers must be clearly 
13 encouraged to explore with any incapacitated participant, to the greatest extent possible, how 
15 
she may feel about her involvement in any research that may not necessarily help her, but which 
16 
17 could help others. Naturally this requires complex concepts to be addressed that sometimes 
18 
19 may be outside a participant’s comprehension. Therefore, how meaning is constructed with 
20 
potential participants is absolutely crucial and the research sections of the MCA fall short of 
22 addressing this, and arguably the COP does not fare much better. 
23 
24 Making efforts to elicit the views of any potential incapacitated participant may reveal 
25 
26 that she has a strong desire to act altruistically and to become involved in a project, a view 
27 which has gained traction under best interests reasoning. For instance, it has previously been 
29 acknowledged that an incapacitated person’s best interests may be served by authorising a bone 
30 
31 marrow donation that conferred no direct medical benefit on her, but which would only benefit 
32 her sibling. This was because that, in the long run, it was agreed she would gain some 
34 emotional, psychological and social benefit from this procedure as it would allow her sister, 
35 
36 and indeed her mother, to spend more time with her in the future.91 In other words, a clear 
37 
38 benefit  could  be  identified  from  helping someone else. This attitude has recently been 
39 reiterated by Morgan J in the Court of Protection, where he confirmed that the best interests 
41 test does not confine a court to considering self-interest, but could be extended to consider how 
42 
43 the potential altruistic wishes of a person could indicate that a course of action ostensibly 
44 
45 designed to help others could in fact be in that person’s best interests.
92 
46 Admittedly, in some instances factors pulling in the opposite direction may be 
48 sufficiently compelling to override the above points, but they could also be considered as part 
49 
50 of a rounded balancing exercise that is typically performed under best interests. All things being 
51 equal, however, where an incapacitated participant is capable of communicating a wish to 
53 participate in research in order to help others, it should be highly persuasive in terms of 
54 
55 
56 
90 Mental Capacity Act 2005: Code of Practice, paras [11.20], [11.24] and [11.29]. 
58 
91 Re Y (Mental Patient: Bone Marrow Donation) [1997] Fam 110. 
59 
60 92 Re G [2010] EWHC 3005; [2010] 11 WLUK 498. 
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3 sanctioning her involvement.  In order to promote this attitude, greater emphasis needs to be 
4 
5 placed on ways in researchers themselves can be encouraged to engage participants with the 
6 
7 research concepts and communication process in whatever way each individual is able. At 
8 present, the legislation gives the impression that this role should be mainly delegated to a 
10 consultee, which carries with it some pitfalls that we explore in more detail below. 
11 
12 We now turn to consider whether other aspects of the MCA could potentially depict the 
13 bespoke research provisions in a more favourable light. While a number of other requirements 
15 
must also be complied with before research can be approved, we argue that these additional 
16 
17 measures impose different obligations on different parties. Thus, far from adding clarity, they 
18 
19 actually send out mixed messages. 
20 
21 
22 D. Researchers; Consultees; MCA RECs: Mixed Responsibilities 
23 
24 i) Researchers 
25 
26 The question of capacity is the first issue that must be addressed by a researcher, and she must 
27 approach this by reference to the general principles contained in the MCA.
93 The starting point 
29 is that capacity should always be presumed, which acts as a safeguard by ensuring that the 
30 
31 burden of disproving capacity rests on the person contesting it. 94 To rebut that presumption, 
32 it must be proven, on the balance of probabilities, that at the material time, a person is unable 
34 to make a decision.95 Under section 3 (1), a person is unable to make a decision if she is unable 
35 
36 to understand the information relevant to the decision, to retain that information, to use or 
37 
38 weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision, or to communicate her 
39 decision (whether by talking, using sign language or any other means).96 This is a decision- 
41 specific, functional approach that focuses on the ability of a participant to actually make a 
42 
43 decision through understanding, remembering, processing and communicating.97 Where a 
44 
45 research participant is deemed to have capacity, her decision about participation remains 
46 
47 
48 
49 93 Mental Capacity Act 2005: Code of Practice, para [11.4]; NHS Health Research Authority, Mental Capacity 
50 Act: https://www.hra.nhs.uk/planning-and-improving-research/policies-standards-legislation/mental-capacity- 
51 act/. <Accessed 21st February 2019>. 
52 
53 
94 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 1 (2). 
54 
95 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 2 (1) 
6
96 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 3 (1) (a) (b) (c) and (d); See also Re C (Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1994] 1 
57 
WLR 290. 
58 
59 97 Michael Gunn, ‘The Meaning of Incapacity’ (1994) 2 Medical Law Review 8. 
60 
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3 sacrosanct.98   If, however, the opposite conclusion is reached, the additional measures of the 
4 
5 MCA will be triggered.  Where research is concerned, specific difficulties arise not only in 
6 
7 relation to who is responsible for performing capacity assessments, but also in respect of the 
8 nature of the test itself. 
10 The test for capacity is notoriously difficult to apply in practice, which often leads to 
11 
12 inconsistencies  in its performance.99 Where a decision relates to treatment, a perceived 
13 advantage is that medical professionals will usually be involved in at least some stage of any 
15 
capacity assessment, yet it is a common misconception that they are all trained in assessing 
16 
17 capacity, when often they are not.100 Research has established that in some instances they do 
18 
19 not fully understand what the legal test requires of them.101 This is mitigated to a degree by the 
20 fact that disputes about capacity in certain treatment decisions may be more likely to be referred 
22 to court for scrutiny. Where this happens, expert testimony will be presented before a judge of 
23 
24 the Court of Protection by professionals who have extensive experience in assessing capacity 
25 
26 by reference to the appropriate legal test. It is not a guaranteed safeguard though, because recent 
27 evidence has suggested that the same select group of experts are often called upon to give 
29 evidence repeatedly, thereby creating the danger of assessments becoming too formulaic an 
30 
31 exercise.102 Nonetheless, an added layer of accountability still exists that has the effect of 
32 ensuring that any query surrounding capacity in delicately poised treatment cases is subject to 
34 forensic judicial scrutiny and open to challenge. No such safety measures are ever likely to be 
35 
36 activated in research. While theoretically it would be possible to ask the Court of Protection to 
37 
38 make a declaration concerning the capacity of a potential research participant, it is highly 
39 
40 
41 
42    
43 98 It was stated by Lord Donaldson MR in Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95 at 102 that ‘an adult 
44 who suffers from no mental incapacity has an absolute right to choose whether to consent to medical treatment, 
45 to refuse it or to choose one rather than another of the treatments being offered...This right of choice is not limited 
46 to decisions which others might regard as sensible. It exists notwithstanding that the reasons for making the choice 
47 are rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent.’ The same principles would apply to research. 
48 
49 99 Mark Jayes et al., ‘How do Health and Social Care Professionals in England and Wales Assess Mental Capacity? 
50 A Literature Review’ (2019) Disability and Rehabilitation 1. Doi: 10.1080/09638288.2019.157293; Paula Case, 
51 ‘Negotiating the Domain of Mental Capacity: Clinical Judgement or Judicial Diagnosis?’ (2016) 16 Medical Law 
52 International 174; Mary Dixon-Woods et al., ‘Research Involving Adults who Lack Capacity: How have Research 
53 Ethics Committees Interpreted the Requirements?’ (2009) 35 Journal of Medical Ethics 377. 
54 
55 
100 Jayes (n 99); Daniel Ratcliff et al., ‘Health and Social Care Practitioners’ Experiences of Assessing Mental 
56 Capacity in a Community Learning Disability Team’ (2016) 44 British Journal of Learning Disabilities 329; 
57 
101 Ibid. 
59 102 Case (n 99). 
60 
Medical Law International Page 24 of 36 
 
 
 
9 
14 
21 
28 
33 
40 
47 
54 
 
1 Medical Law International Submission 
2 
Page 24 of 36 
3 unlikely to happen in practice.103 Individuals involved in the research approval process  will 
4 
5 have little incentive to seek such a declaration and, given the extra cost and additional time, the 
6 
7 chances are that it will never be pursued.  It follows that an important layer of legal scrutiny 
8 that exists in regard to certain treatment cases, is effectively lost in the realms of research The 
10 only real safeguard that exists in respect of the capacity question is, therefore, grounded in the 
11 
12 overall scrutiny that a MCA REC maintains over a project, but we argue later that this may be 
13 an inappropriate forum to oversee this issue. 
15 
Following on from this, the problems associated with capacity assessments are likely 
16 
17 to be amplified in research, particularly given that the scope of the MCA seems to have been 
18 
19 broadened to cover a variety of non-invasive methods.104  Certain types of researchers involved 
20 in certain types of projects may have little if no experience in dealing with capacity 
22 assessments. The less exposure a researcher has had to dealing with borderline incapacitated 
23 
24 participants who may exhibit difficulty with understanding, problems with speech and 
25 
26 language, and poor memory and recall, the more difficult it may become for her to make an 
27 accurate determination as to whether recourse to the research provisions of the MCA is 
29 necessary. Where a researcher perceives that she may be confronted with such individuals, she 
30 
31 may be inclined to avoid any challenging capacity-related questions by simply altering the 
32 
parameters of her investigation.  If there is a propensity to avoid rather than confront these 
34 difficult questions, the problem becomes self-perpetuating as researchers will never gain 
35 
36 enough experience to become more proficient in assessing capacity and valued participants 
37 
38 may continue to be excluded. 
39 In research, a ‘grey area’ will also often exist. Some projects will be a one-off, but 
41 others may necessitate more prolonged involvement from a participant. It is thus possible that 
42 
43 if a participant is asked to take part in a project over a sustained period of time, that she may 
44 
45 experience fluctuating capacity at various junctures.
105 Moreover, as capacity is technically 
46 decision-specific, there may be some components of a research project that a participant may 
48 have capacity to agree to, and others which she may not.106 While there is some legal 
49 
50 
51 
52 
103 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 15. 
53 
104 See discussion above at (n 46). 
5 
105 In Re MB (Caesarean Section) [1997] 2 WLUK 313; [1997] 2 FLR 426 it was confirmed that a person could 
56 
be rendered ‘temporarily’ incapacitated. See also Barton W Palmer et al., ‘Changes in Capacity to Consent over 
57 
time in Patients Involved in Psychiatric Research’ (2013) 202 The British Journal of Psychiatry 454. 
58 
59 106 An NHS Trust v MB and Others (n 75). 
60 
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3 recognition of the possibility of a ‘temporary’ loss of capacity,107 untrained researchers may be 
4 
5 unaware of it and hence be more inclined to view the question of capacity as absolute instead 
6 
7 of relative.108 Therefore, if capacity cannot be evidenced securely, exclusion may follow, 
8 which may be unnecessary. If capacity also appears to fluctuate during the course of a project, 
10 there may be a greater inclination from a researcher to think that a participant has lost capacity 
11 
12 while the research is ongoing, when that assessment may be inaccurate. If a participant is then 
13 withdrawn on this mistaken belief, her exclusion from a project may be overly premature and 
15 
needlessly damaging to the research.109 Alternatively, the opposite problem may occur in 
16 
17 which a mistaken belief that a participant has capacity causes her involvement in a study to 
18 
19 continue, where it may be inappropriate and perhaps even harmful to allow it to happen.110 
20 Naturally, it must be acknowledged that capacity related concerns may be only one reason for 
22 exclusion. A researcher may operate cautiously because of a perceived fear her own legal 
23 
24 exposure, or, worse still, for the sake of administrative convenience. Engaging the mechanisms 
25 
26 of the MCA and its associated safeguards carries with it cost, time and resource implications 
27 which some may wish to avoid.  Whatever the reason though, there is a problem if those who 
29 actually remain capable of contributing something of value to a project are unnecessarily 
30 
31 discounted, and if those whose capacity is compromised are included without thorough review. 
32 It follows that clearer and more specific guidance is required for researchers in terms of how 
34 they should approach capacity assessments and what should form part of their decision-making 
35 
36 processes when addressing the question of participant inclusion.111 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 107 Above (n 105). 
48 
49 
108 One of the problems with capacity is that it is often reduced to a binary ‘yes’ or ‘no’ question, when it should 
50 be understood as a more fluid concept. For an excellent discussion of some of the problems with the capacity 
51 ‘cliff-edge’, and some interesting suggestions for reform, see Emily Jackson, ‘From “Doctor Knows Best” to 
52 Dignity: Placing Adults Who Lack Capacity at the Centre of Decisions About Their Medical Treatment’ (2018) 
53 81 Modern Law Review 247. 
54 
109 The MCA makes provisions for loss of capacity during a project. Should this happen, it would seem that 
55 immediate exclusion would not automatically be necessary. See Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 34. 
56 
57 
110 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 33 (4) and (5). 
58 
59 111 For a number of interesting suggestions, see Jackson (n 108). 
60 
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5 A further obligation placed on the researcher by the MCA is the requirement to appoint a 
6 
7 consultee. This individual must be prepared to be consulted by a researcher about whether or 
8 not an incapacitated participant should be included within a research project, and to offer her 
10 opinion as to what a participant’s wishes and feeling would be likely to be about taking part in 
11 
12 the project if she had capacity.112 Two different types of consultee are recognised. A researcher 
13 must first seek to appoint a ‘personal’ consultee, which is defined as a person who otherwise 
15 
than in a professional capacity or for remuneration, is engaged in caring for the participant or 
16 
17 is interested in her welfare.113 If no such person can be identified, the researcher, in agreement 
18 
19 with a MCA REC, must then appoint a ‘nominated’ consultee. This is someone who has no 
20 connection with the research, but who is still prepared to be consulted about the potential 
22 involvement of an incapacitated participant.114 The rationale behind this system is to ensure 
23 
24 that an incapacitated participant is represented by an independent advocate who has no vested 
25 
26 interest in the research, and to maximise the potential for her subjective views and beliefs to be 
27 heard and respected in decisions about research. This is the archetypal example of the MCA 
29 seeking to balance out the aims of protection and empowerment, but whether or not the 
30 
31 consultee requirement serves either purpose effectively is open to question. 
32 First, there are some pragmatic difficulties. The system begins by placing an obligation 
34 on a researcher to find an appropriate person who has some type of pre-existing personal 
35 
36 relationship with a potential participant. Depending on the circumstances, it may actually be 
37 
38 very difficult to locate such an individual. The extent of a researcher’s duty is to ‘take 
39 reasonable steps’ to locate a personal consultee, but this is ambiguous.115 One advantage is that 
41 it provides a degree of flexibility, so that where any proposed research is scheduled to take 
42 
43 place in, say, Norwich, it may be deemed unreasonable to impose on a researcher an obligation 
44 
45 to make extensive efforts to contact a participant’s distant relative in a remote part of Australia. 
46 The drawback is that determining what may amount to taking reasonable steps is open to 
48 interpretation. The question will be scrutinised by a MCA REC, so the potential for differing 
49 
50 interpretations across the spectrum may add to increased anxiety among researchers. An even 
51 
52 
53 
54 
112 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 32 (4) (a) and (b). 
55 
113 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 32 (2) (a). 
7 
114 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 32 (3) (a) and (b) 
58 
59 115 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 32 (2). 
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3 greater predicament unfolds where it is not possible to identify a personal consultee. A 
4 
5 researcher must then clearly address any arrangements for appointing a nominated consultee 
6 
7 when seeking approval from a MCA REC.116 This enables the latter to assess whether or not 
8 there is a convincing reason for not appointing a personal consultee, and for it to advise on the 
10 suitability of the arrangements that have been installed for appointing a nominated consultee. 
11 
12 A MCA REC may recommend a person who could suitably act in this capacity, and in some 
13 instances direction on this question may be helpful, yet any guidance may still not remedy the 
15 
array of problems connected with the notion of a nominated consultee. 
16 
17 Not infrequently, a researcher may have to approach a nominated consultee who is 
18 
19 involved in providing professional care or support for a potential research participant.117 
20 Provided they are not connected to the project, this is permissible, but the problem is that a 
22 researcher is reliant on the good will of that professional person.118 Professional people, 
23 
24 whatever their discipline, will often not have the time to devote to acting as a consultee for an 
25 
26 incapacitated participant whose circumstances they may not be hugely familiar with. A number 
27 of potential candidates may decline the invitation, not necessarily because they lack altruistic 
29 tendencies, but simply because they may be unable to devote sufficient time to discharge the 
30 
31 relevant duty appropriately, especially if it becomes an ongoing obligation. It is too gross a 
32 generalisation to suggest that all potential nominated consultees will respond in the negative, 
34 for there may be some willing volunteers who will make the time for what they perceive to be 
35 
36 a valuable social function. However, the greater number of nominated consultees that refuse to 
37 
38 participate at the first time of asking, the further removed the eventual appointed person may 
39 become from an incapacitated participant. A risk is also apparent as in some cases no one will 
41 agree to act as a consultee, which would effectively block the involvement of some potential 
42 
43 participants. If researchers consistently encounter complications insofar as identifying and 
44 
45 appointing consultees, then this may chill their enthusiasm for conducting research involving 
46 incapacitated individuals, especially if it is perceived to be an excessively burdensome obstacle 
48 that is capable of causing significant harm to time-sensitive research. 
49 
50 The system is also predicated on a misconception that a consultee will always be able 
51 to offer a convincing opinion about the values, wishes, and beliefs of an incapacitated 
53 
54 
55 
56 
116 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 32 (4) (a) and (b). 
57 
117 See Department of Health, Guidance on Nominating a Consultee for Research Involving Adults Who Lack 
58 Capacity to Consent (DOH London 2008) at 8. 
59 
60 118 Ibid. 
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3 participant.  A personal consultee, as someone who already knows the participant, may be 
4 
5 better placed to advise on these considerations than any researcher or nominated consultee, but 
6 
7 it is by no means certain that they will be able to do this effectively in every case. In terms of 
8 a nominated consultee, the more remote the relationship between her and a participant, the less 
10 chance she has of being able to comment accurately on any personal views that participant may 
11 
12 hold. Some proposed nominated consultees may recognise this danger and where they have 
13 little or no knowledge of a participant may simply decline to become involved, for proceeding 
15 
on this basis may cause the system to become artificial, and perhaps even harmful. A natural 
16 
17 concomitant of this, however, is that the problems of recruitment identified earlier become 
18 
19 amplified. 
20 The notion that the consultee system will promote empowerment by attempting to 
22 accommodate the subjective position of an incapacitated participant is, in any event, 
23 
24 misleading. Placing emphasis on the personal values, wishes and beliefs of incapacitated 
25 
26 individuals is sometimes said to be an autonomy-enhancing type of substitute decision-making, 
27 but it will not operate as such in every case.
119 A consultee must only offer her opinion to the 
29 researcher about what she considers would be the likely wishes and feelings of an incapacitated 
30 
31 participant about involvement in a project, but it is crucial to note that it often may not be the 
32 actual wishes and feelings of the participant herself that are conveyed, but simply a consultee’s 
34 interpretation of them. The more serious the impairment affecting capacity, and the more 
35 
36 detached a consultee is from knowing a participant personally, the more likely it is that the 
37 
38 consultee’s advice to the researcher will not closely reflect the wishes and feelings of a potential 
39 participant. Given these difficulties, it is a challenge for a consultee to identify the precise scope 
41 of her duty and what steps she must take to discharge it. Absent any clearer guidance, she may 
42 
43 be hesitant to recommend participation. This may sometimes be sensible, but if over-cautious 
44 
45 thinking from an untrained consultee prevails, it may lead to her misinterpreting certain signals 
46 from an incapacitated participant as objections, when they are actually not. If this happens, it 
48 has potentially far-reaching consequences for encouraging wider participation as a consultee 
49 
50 effectively enjoys a power of veto if they advise that participation should not go ahead.120 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
119 See Wye Valley NHS Trust v B [2015] EWCOP 60; Skowron (n 3); Lucy Series ‘The Place of Wishes and 
57 
Feelings in Best Interests Decisions: Wye Valley NHS Trust v Mr B’ (2016) 79 Modern Law Review 1101. 
59 120 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 32 (5). 
60 
Page 29 of 36 Medical Law International 
 
 
 
9 
14 
21 
28 
33 
40 
58 
 
1 Medical Law International Submission 
2 
Page 29 of 36 
3 The lack of clarity may also cause consultees to think that they can actually make a 
4 
5 decision for an incapacitated participant by attempting to step into her shoes.121    This view  is 
6 
7 misguided, for an opinion cannot be legitimately justified by a claim that it is what a participant 
8 would have wanted to happen if she had capacity, when in fact she may never have had it in 
10 the first place.122  Signs of a confused sense of responsibility begin to emerge here. The 
11 
12 consultee does not provide consent for an incapacitated participant, she simply advises. It is 
13 actually a researcher who should make a final decision about inclusion, but whether or not this 
15 
is recognised as being the correct legal position by the various parties involved in the 
16 
17 authorisation process is the subject of doubt.123 Technically speaking it is correct to recognise 
18 
19 that a consultee has no legal power to consent, but if she is still given the power to advise that 
20 participation may be inappropriate, which is then viewed by both researchers and MCA RECs 
22 as being determinative, the difference between the power to decide and the mere power to 
23 
24 advise effectively evaporates.124 The upshot is that consultees may frequently play a defining 
25 
26 role in the authorisation of research and this accords to them powers which exceed those 
27 initially contemplated by the Act.
125 
29 The drafting of the MCA adds a further layer of confusion in terms of the obligations it 
30 
31 creates. While  it  is  incumbent  on  a  consultee  to  offer  an  opinion  on  an incapacitated 
32 participant’s wishes and feelings, the Act itself does not specifically direct a researcher to 
34 consider things from that perspective.126 It is left to the COP to clarify that researchers have a 
35 
36 continuing obligation to consider the person’s wishes and feelings, but we have already 
37 
38 highlighted  that  is  inappropriate  where  the  matter  is  of  such crucial importance.127 An 
39 impression is thereby created from the terms of the MCA that researchers have no specific duty 
41 to consider things from the perspective of the participant, as this is a role that is to be performed 
42 
43 exclusively  by  the  consultee. It would be regrettable if this misunderstanding become 
44 
45 
46 121 In legal terms, this is known as the substituted judgment approach. It has not been endorsed in England, but 
47 has been used in some American cases. See Strunk v Strunk [1969] 445 S.W.2d 145. 
48 122 For an interesting discussion on this point see Shaun D Pattinson, Medical Law and Ethics (5th edn, Sweet & 
49 Maxwell, 2017) at 149 and 455. 
50 
51 
123 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 32 (4) (a) and (b); Mental Capacity Act 2005: Code of Practice, para [11.27]. It 
52 should be noted here that the researcher does not ‘consent’ for the participant either. 
53 
54 
124 Above (n 120). 
55 
56 
125 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 32 (4) (a) and (b). 
57 
126 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 32 (2) – (6). 
59 127 Above (n 90). 
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3 widespread, as it is dangerous to rely on the consultee system to fill this void. If researchers 
4 
5 inadvertently lose sight of these key elements, or at least attach less importance to them, this is 
6 
7 problematic. This is because, more often than not, it is a researcher and not a consultee who 
8 
may be best placed to consider how aspects of a particular project may impact upon the personal 
10 circumstances of an individual, and to provide her with the help and support she needs to make 
11 
12 a decision for herself. The MCA’s entire system of research regulation needs to emphasise this 
13 more explicitly. 
15 
We have insufficient space here to provide a comprehensive discussion regarding how 
16 
17 to optimise supported decision-making. However, one possible starting point is the judgment 
18 
19 of Baker J in CC v KK.128 One of the issues to be decided in the case was whether the applicant 
20 had capacity to make decisions about where she should live. Baker J warned that assessing 
22 capacity from a “blank canvas” was inappropriate and stressed that a person under 
23 
24 consideration needs to be provided with relevant information and detailed options so that their 
25 
26 capacity to weigh up those options can be fairly assessed.
129 Equally, it is not a requirement 
27 that a person has to demonstrate an ability to understand and weigh up every nuance and detail, 
29 as long as she understands the salient factors.130 If support is provided to help a person achieve 
30 
31 this, it may change the outlook of a number of capacity assessments. For example, on the facts, 
32 Baker J suggested that some steps that the local authority may wish to consider taking could 
34 involve a series of overnight trial visits, with all the necessary support, to enable the applicant 
35 
36 to reach a decision about whether she wished to move back home or if she would prefer to 
37 
38 remain in a nursing home.131 Even though CC did not concern research, the key message is the 
39 same: it is crucial to take all practicable steps to enable a person to make a decision for 
41 herself.132 
42 
43 Researchers, then, should be encouraged to provide potential participants with relevant 
44 
45 information about a project in a way that is comprehensible to that individual. Tailored steps 
46 must also be taken to assist that person to understand the key points of the project, and to 
48 encourage her to enter into a dialogue about what the research is intended to achieve. This 
49 
50 could include, inter alia, techniques such as the provision of easy read materials, visual aids 
51 
52 
53 
128 CC v KK and STCC [2012] EWHC 2136; [2012] 7 WLUK 861. 
54 
129  Ibid at [68]. 
56 
130  Ibid at [69]. 
58 
131  Ibid at [75]. 
59 
60 132 Ibid. 
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3 and flash cards to assist in comprehension. We are by no means claiming that this is a definitive 
4 
5 formula to ameliorate the difficulties associated with implementing a supported decision- 
6 
7 making model in practice, but what we propose are at least some suggestions that could be 
8 employed to assist a person, where possible, to make her own decision about participation in 
10 research. 
11 
12 The final question we now address is whether the additional requirement of needing to 
13 gain approval from an MCA REC adds anything more of value to the approval process. 
15 
16 
iii) MCA RECs 
18 A MCA REC retains overall responsibility for the final authorisation of any project involving 
19 
20 incapacitated participants and its seal of approval is needed to render any intrusive research 
21 
22 lawful.
133 This oversight serves multiple functions, such as promoting integrity in research, 
23 maintaining high standards of ethical practice and assessing whether or not a researcher has 
25 discharged  all  her  obligations  under the legislation. A MCA REC may also review any 
26 
27 considerations pertaining to capacity, and on occasion provide advice to a researcher on 
28 arrangements for appointing a consultee. Given the enhanced vulnerability of incapacitated 
30 participants, the need for specialist MCA REC supervision was introduced to inject an 
31 
32 enhanced layer of independent objective scrutiny to the approval process.134 In theory, this 
33 
34 may seem like a sensible attitude, but its effectiveness should not go unchallenged. It has been 
35 common practice for some time now to obtain approval from an appropriate ethics committee 
37 before any type of research involving human participants takes place, whether capacitous or 
38 
39 not.135 The NHS has its own ethics committees, so too have other organisations.136 With this 
40 
41 in mind, imagine hypothetically that the specific provisions of the MCA were not enacted; if 
42 that were the case, a university social science researcher proposing a project involving the use 
43 
44 of incapacitated participants would still be obliged by her institution to seek approval from one 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 133 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 31. 
50 
51 134 HL Deb 18 June 2004, vol 422, cols 69 - 70: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written- 
52 statements/2004/jun/18/mental-capacity-bill#S6CV0422P2_20040618_CWS_5. <Accessed 26th February 
53 2019>. 
54 
55 
135 See UK Research Integrity Office, Code of Practice for Research: Promoting Good Practice and Preventing 
56 Misconduct (UK Research Integrity Office 2009). 
57 
136 See, amongst others, the Health Research Authority: https://www.hra.nhs.uk/about-us/committees-and- 
58 services/res-and-recs/research-ethics-committees-overview/; the British Psychological Society: 
59 https://www.bps.org.uk/news-and-policy/bps-code-ethics-and-conduct. 
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3 of its own ethics committees before any work commenced, so a natural question to ask is: what 
4 
5 extra, if anything, is gained by the MCA’s insertion of mandated MCA REC authorisation? 
6 
7 One advantage resides in the nature of the obligation created. While there are some 
8 exceptions, the majority of more mainstream research on human participants is referred to 
10 ethics committees on the basis of good practice, rather than being a specific legal 
11 
12 requirement.137 Thus, in the hypothetical scenario presented above, without any legal direction 
13 from the MCA, a university researcher wishing to use incapacitated participants in a routine 
15 
project would only be bound by a professional obligation to seek ethical approval, not a legal 
16 
17 one. Admittedly, if she proceeded without it, she may well be subject to professional regulatory 
18 
19 sanctions for misconduct in research, but that is different than characterising her conduct as 
20 being unlawful. It is here where the benefit of the MCA’s insistence on specific approval from 
22 a MCA REC becomes apparent, for it sends out a powerful symbolic message in identifying 
23 
24 that intrusive research involving vulnerable incapacitated participants is deserved of a special 
25 
26 legal status. A possible deterrent effect is as well brought to the fore because the consequences 
27 of failing to gain ethical approval are potentially more serious where that omission would lead 
29 to not only unprofessional, but also to unlawful, activity. Where a researcher is aware of this, 
30 
31 it is perhaps likely to induce a greater incentive to comply with the legal requirement imposed 
32 by the MCA, thereby ensuring that projects will be subject to a greater degree of specialist 
34 scrutiny. Accordingly, it seems plausible to suggest that the obligation to gain approval from 
35 
36 a MCA REC has the potential to positively influence the way people think about research and 
37 
38 incapacitated participants, particularly because it signifies that especial measures must be 
39 adhered to in the approval process. The theory behind its inclusion therefore may have some 
41 merit, but nonetheless there are other concerns. 
42 
43 The insistence upon approval from a specific MCA REC, instead of a more general 
44 
45 ethics committee, is presumably based on the fact that the former will have the opportunity to 
46 develop specialist expertise in dealing with proposals that seek to involve incapacitated 
48 participants. MCA REC members will receive customised training that will assist them in 
49 
50 assessing whether the requirements for approval have been adequately met. Nevertheless, the 
51 composition of a particular committee may impact upon outcomes. Membership of a MCA 
53 REC should include a range of individuals from a variety of different backgrounds, including 
54 
55 
56    
57 
137 For a list of the types of research that require ethical approval by law, see Health Research Authority, 
58 
Governance Arrangements for Research Ethics Committees (HRA 2018) at [2.3]. It should be noted that most 
59 
reputable academic journals require proof of ethical approval where human participants have been involved. 
60 
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3 both professional people and lay representatives.138    This inevitably means though that they 
4 
5 will have varying degrees of expertise across different fields, depending on the experience of 
6 
7 the individuals sitting on them. Experts who have worked in psychiatry and mental health will 
8 naturally have an important role to play in sitting on such a specialist committee, but the extent 
10 to which each separate committee will include members with significant expertise in assessing 
11 
12 capacity by reference to the legal test is somewhat unknown. There is no assurance that this 
13 important question will receive the same amount of rigorous scrutiny as it would do in a formal 
15 
court setting.139 This problem is not confined to the question of capacity, because if a particular 
16 
17 MCA REC happens to have an experienced lawyer well versed in interpreting statutes amongst 
18 
19 its membership, there may well be closer examination of the myriad of different meanings that 
20 could be ascribed to the thresholds for approval than would be present in other MCA RECs 
22 that do not possess the same personnel. 
23 
24 The  logistics  of  the  approval  process  may  also  frustrate  matters. There are 
25 
26 circumstances in which an on-going project will be the subject of periodic review from a MCA 
27 REC, but more often than not the approval process is anticipatory and forward-looking in 
29 nature. Researchers are not supposed to recruit participants beforehand, so any inquiry by a 
30 
31 MCA REC is somewhat limited to exploring the procedures that have been put in place for 
32 ensuring that capacity assessments are carried out appropriately, and for securing the 
34 appointment  of  consultees. Within this, a MCA REC will probably want to check a 
35 
36 researcher’s experience and understanding of assessing such things as capacity, but it is 
37 
38 unlikely to be able to assess individually the capacity of each participant for itself. This means 
39 that a MCA REC has to put significant faith in a researcher’s ability, and we have already 
41 demonstrated that some will experience difficulty in dealing with complex issues such as 
42 
43 capacity, not through any fault of their own, but because it is a nebulous and participant-specific 
44 
45 concept.
140 The disadvantage of forward-looking scrutiny is not exclusive to capacity, but also 
46 plagues the further conditions for approval. We have illuminated that many of the factors that 
48 fall to be examined under those provisions should be recognised as inherently subjective 
49 
50 questions. The potential effect that a project may have on an incapacitated participant must, 
51 therefore, be considered from the angle of that individual. Nonetheless, the precise individual 
53 
54 
138 See HRA Guidance: https://www.hra.nhs.uk/about-us/committees-and-services/res-and-recs/become-rec- 
55 
member/. <accessed 26th March 2019>. 
57 
139 Case (n 99). 
59 140 Gunn (n 97); Palmer (n 105). 
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3 is often unidentified at the approval stage and it follows that a MCA REC is precluded from 
4 
5 engaging in any rigorous subjective scrutiny.141  Based on this, the dichotomy of responsibility 
6 
7 between a researcher and a MCA REC becomes even more pronounced. 
8 The legislation dictates that the ultimate responsibility for ascertaining whether the 
10 requirements under section 31 have been met rests with a MCA REC, but prospective 
11 
12 researchers would be well advised to carry these requirements in mind when initially designing 
13 any  project. However, throughout this piece we have demonstrated the multitude of 
15 
interpretations that could, potentially, attach to the approval requirements and there is no 
16 
17 certainty that a researcher and a MCA REC will think about these issues in the same way. Some 
18 
19 members of a MCA REC could, for example, treat certain research requirements as being 
20 analogous to a best interests standard and review them with that in mind. A researcher, on the 
22 other hand, could view them in an alternative way, with more exclusive focus on mitigating 
23 
24 risk rather than seeking to highlight any benefits. The potential for inconsistency between the 
25 
26 various levels of decision-maker is thereby exacerbated. Similarly, certain MCA RECs may 
27 adopt a lenient approach to assessing the criteria for approval, whereas others may embrace a 
29 more hard-line stance. This may tempt a researcher to identify what are perceived to be more 
30 
31 sympathetic MCA RECs when deciding where to send a project for approval, but if such 
32 cherry-picking becomes commonplace it would be unfortunate, as it could undermine the very 
34 need to gain ethical approval in the first place. 
35 
36 Very little is actually known about how MCA RECs operate, both in terms of the 
37 
38 volume and type of research that they are asked to approve, and of the actual dynamics of their 
39 decision-making processes. In the light of this, McHale’s assertion is undoubtedly accurate that 
41 this is an area in which further empirical research is required to gain a better understanding of 
42 
43 how MCA RECs actually function in practice.142 
44 
45 
46 E. Conclusions 
47 The fact that the MCA sought to address the issue of intrusive research involving incapacitated 
49 participants is commendable. Had it overlooked the issue entirely, which was not beyond the 
50 
51 realms of possibility, a considerable gap would have continued to exist in the law of England 
52 
53 and Wales.143 However, some of the problems that we have alluded to may have derived from 
54 
55 
56 
141 Bartlett (n 12) at 90. 
57 
142 McHale (n 5); Dixon-Woods (n 95). See also the details of the ASSENT Project @ UEA, above (n 45). 
59 143 HL Deb 10 January 2005, vol 668, cols 17 – 18. https://api.parliament.uk/historic- 
60 
hansard/lords/2005/jan/10/mental-capacity-bill. <Accessed 26th February 2019>. 
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3 the main thrust of the MCA being focused on treatment, welfare and financial decisions as 
4 
5 opposed to research.144 The  research  provisions  operate  from  the  wrong  standpoint and 
6 
7 arguably continue along a skewed trajectory, perhaps betraying the fact that research was very 
8 much an afterthought. Insufficient time seems to have been devoted to identifying clear aims 
10 and objectives and to creating an effective regime that would adequately meet them.145 
11 
12 Certainly, the research sections do not appear to sit comfortably with the other aspects of the 
13 MCA and, in places, appear to have been rather restrictively drafted. 
15 
Establishing a separate set of substantive tests that must be met in order to gain approval 
16 
17 does not, in reality, achieve the objective of providing a fair balance between protection and 
18 
19 empowerment. This goal could arguably have been better achieved by assessing the existing 
20 objective and subjective factors that must be considered under a traditional section 4 MCA best 
22 interests assessment. The additional measures introduced that require the appointment of a 
23 
24 consultee and the final approval from a MCA REC are also of questionable effectiveness. The 
25 
26 idea that a third-party consultee can act as an effective advocate and thus empower an 
27 incapacitated participant by ensuring that her voice is heard is frustrated by its impracticalities. 
29 A system that promotes co-operation between a researcher and a participant, with a renewed 
30 
31 emphasis on seeking positive assent from a participant, may be a more desirable method of 
32 guaranteeing  greater  emphasis  on supported decision-making.146 Similarly, very little is 
34 known about how a MCA REC actually forms its opinion, and about what is at the forefront of 
35 
36 the minds of its members when making a decision on a given project. Significant variation in 
37 
38 interpretation of the requirements for approval could lead to a pattern of inconsistency between 
39 MCA RECs, which has the potential to undermine the perceived value of the system. What is 
41 clear, however, is that the manner in which the research requirements have been drafted creates 
42 
43 the impression that the researcher, the consultee and the MCA REC are subjective to differing 
44 
45 
46 144 See the literature cited above (n 4), and also Marcus Jepson et al., ‘Indirect Payments: When the Mental 
47 Capacity Act Interacts with the Personalisation Agenda’ (2016) 24 Health and Social Care in the Community 623; 
48 Marie Poole et al., ‘Going Home?: An Ethnographic Study of Assessment of Capacity and Best Interests in People 
49 with Dementia being Discharged from Hospital’ (2014) 14 BMC Geriatrics 56; Jill Manthorpe et al., ‘Early Days: 
50 Knowledge and Use of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 by Care Home Managers and Staff’ (2011) 10 Dementia 
51 283. 
52 
53 
145 HL Deb 18 June 2004, vol 422, cols 67-70: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written- 
54 statements/2004/jun/18/mental-capacity-bill#S6CV0422P2_20040618_CWS_5. <Accessed 26th February 
55 2019>. This Hansard debate discusses the aims of the MCA 2005. Research is only mentioned sparingly. 
56 
146 Shiggins (n 54); Amanda Sibley et al., ‘Developing a New Justification for Assent’ (2016) 17 BMC Medical 
57 Ethics 1. DOI 10.1186/s12910-015-0085-x; Amanda Sibley et al., ‘Assent is not Consent’ (2012) 38 Journal of 
58 Medical Ethics 3; Susan Slaughter et al., ‘Consent and Assent to Participate in Research from People with 
59 Dementia’ (2007) 14 Nursing Ethics 27. 
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3 obligations which all potentially overlap, but which may not necessarily be viewed in that way. 
4 
5 This sense of confusion may cause researchers to become disillusioned with the system of 
6 
7 approval and therefore reluctant to consider incapacitated participants in the future. If the 
8 research provisions of the MCA are having this effect, they are arguably impeding the very 
10 type of activity that they should be seeking to promote and this ought to be recognised as a 
11 
12 problem that needs resolving. 
13 
14 
15 Endnote: This article provides a doctrinal analysis of the law and did not involve human 
16 participants. As such, ethical approval was not required for this research. However, the 
17 empirical components of the larger scale ASSENT Project at UEA obtained ethical approval 
18 from the Social Care REC, London. REC Reference: 18/IEC08/0042; IRAS Project ID: 
19 244132. Professor Rob Heywood was the lead author of this article, and is a Co-Investigator 
20 on the ASSENT Project. Dr Karen Bunning is the Principal Investigator on the ASSENT 
22 Project. All other authors are Co-Investigators on the ASSENT Project. 
23 
24 We are extremely grateful to the Nuffield Foundation’s Law in Society Scheme for generously 
25 funding the ASSENT Project at UEA. 
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